Which dimension of economic development spurred support to democracy? This study focuses on industrialization as the dimension triggering the process of political "modernization". It uses a new dataset on Napoleonic plebiscites under the second French Empire (-). The results in those plebiscites provide a detailed cross-départements (French main administrative units) measure of opposition to autocracy. This study uses the variations in the thriving French modernization to disentangle the effect of industrialization on the vote from the one of other dimensions of economic development. Doubling industrial employment in the Puy-de-Dôme département (median of the distribution) would have decreased support to autocracy by .-. percentage points. An IV strategy using distance to the first city having adopted steam engines, access to coal and waterpower as instruments suggests causality. The baseline results are robust to controlling for other explanations of the vote and to using alternative specifications and estimation methods.
. Introduction
Autocrats are suspicious of economic development, because they face a trade-off between fostering and hindering economic development (Olson ) . Economic development indeed increases future economic rents but jeopardizes the political status quo. Some autocrats are famous for having cautiously hindered development. Mobutu, for instance, boasted about never having built a road in Zaïre.
 Is this behavior rational? Does economic development actually unleash a political opposition in autocracies? Lipset () suggests that it does. He describes a broad process of "modernization" in which economic development fuels the demand for democracy and institutional change. What may ignite the process is unclear (Squicciarini and Voigtländer ) , and no facet of modernization has so far emerged as the trigger driving the process leading to an opposition to autocracy (Acemoglu et al. ) . For example, the level of GDP per capita, the emergence of a middle-class (Barro ), a split in the economic interest of the elite (Lizzeri and Persico ) and human capital accumulation (Papaioannou and Siourounis ) have been considered as drivers of modernization.
One of the drivers of modernization mentioned by Lipset () has however been neglected: industrialization. Yet, it is often perceived as the main cause of the first wave of democratic transitions (Hirschman ; Fukuyama ) . This dimension is moreover Taking advantage of these features, this study addresses two interrelated questions: Does industrialization influence the emergence of a political opposition in autocracies? Does this effect run through on another dimension of modernization?
The results suggest that industrialization fueled a political opposition to Napoléon III's regime. Increasing industrial employment by  percent decreased the share of "Yes" ballots in the  May,  plebiscite by .-. percentage point. Industrialization explains a difference of .-. percentage points in support to autocracy between a mildlyindustrialized départements (Puy-de-dôme, the median of the distribution) and a topindustrialized département (Marne, the th percentile of the distribution). This effect remains stable when controlling for other dimensions of modernization, alternative explanations of the vote and using different specifications.
. Industrialization and political opposition in autocracy
The current literature extensively documents the impact institutions have on economic development (Acemoglu et al., forthcoming) . Yet, the existence of a reverse relation remains unsettled. Section  returns to the vast work on institutional responses to economic development to stress the theoretical underpinnings of this study. It first discusses how industrialization bred structural changes spurring opposition to autocracy. Second, it emphasizes how industrialization intrinsically prompts opposition to autocracy.
. Indirect effects of industrialization on the opposition to autocracy: intertwined dimensions of modernization
First, by increasing productivity, industrialization raises revenues that in turn seed the support for new political regimes. Second, it prompts the formation of an opposition to autocracy by boosting human capital accumulation. Third, industrialization often interlaces with urbanization. This agglomeration effect may as well foster opposition to autocracy.
.. Industrialization, income, and opposition to autocratic rule. Industrialization, through technological improvement, increases income. According to Lipset () , economic development in a country increases the demand for a democratic regime among its citizens. Barro () empirically confirms this intuition of a positive impact of wealth on democracy using a panel of  countries. Empirical results from Barro () confirm the importance of lagged GDP per capita on indexes measuring law and order and democracy using various estimation methods.
Further works document the impact of the level of GDP per capita on the likelihood of an actual democratic transition-the most likely outcome of a genuine opposition to autocracy. Boix and Stokes () observe that the level of development in a country increases the probability of transition to democracy: above a GDP per capita of $., a country surely undergoes a transition to democracy in the short run. They stress that this dynamic led the first wave of democratic transitions in Western Europe. Epstein et al. () confirm these findings using a trichotomous measure of democracy in a sample of  countries from  to . Similarly, Treisman () refines the modernization hypothesis and presents empirical evidence showing that GDP per capita in developmental dictatorships increases the probability of democratization after the incumbent dictator's exit.
Steam democracy up! Industrialization-led opposition in Napoleonic plebiscites  By increasing productivity and generating wealth, industrialization encourages the transition to democracy. This transition is however expected to materialize only in the medium run, after a certain level of income is achieved.
.. Industrialization, increasing human capital and opposition to autocratic rule. In nineteenth century France, industrialization may have boosted another factor fueling the demand for democracy: human capital. Because the complexity of the production process and mechanization increased the need for skills, industrialization contributed to increasing human capital. Franck and Galor () investigate the impact of exogenous acrossdépartements differences in steam engines adoption at early phase of industrialization on literacy and education achievement in France. They confirm causality from industrialization to literacy and education attainment. De Pleijt et al. () find that English counties that adopted steam engines at early phase of industrialization later had a higher share of skilled workers. Overall, the literature establishes a positive impact of industrialization on human capital; either on educational outcomes or on skills.
Beyond the association between wealth and democracy, the accumulation of human capital plays a critical role in the process of modernization (Papaioannou and Siourounis ; Murtin and Warcziag ). Schooling indeed incites people to interact and collaborate. It therefore contributes to the formation of civic capital (Glaeser et al. ) . Higher civic capital fosters political participation. Since a higher portion of society takes part in political activities, the support for an inclusive political regime increases. It moreover fuels political grievance if it is not rewarded accordingly (see Campante and Chor ; using the Arab Spring as an illustration). Accordingly, industrialization may have spurred opposition to Napoléon III via this channel.
.. Industrialization, urbanization, and opposition to autocratic rule. Industrialization is often accompanied by urbanization.
 It spurs the migration of the workforce to urban centers (Rosenberg and Trajtenberg ) . Hence, it generates agglomeration effects prompting the organization of a political opposition and eases the access to "revolutionary technologies".
 Urbanization is expected to foster the returns from these technologies as it simplifies their implementation and their diffusion. It also eases the diffusion of information and increases civic capital (Glaeser and Millett-Steinberg ) . The diffusion of information and ideas matters for the organization of a political opposition (Aidt and Jensen ) . Therefore, urbanization encourages the formation of a political opposition by reducing the cost of protesting and the expected cost of repression (DiPasquale and Glaeser ).
Yet, the capacity of dictatorships to control protests spreads the support to autocratic regimes (Djankov et al. ) . If the autocrat fails to control them, then the drawbacks of autocracy may outweigh its benefits. As a consequence, people favor democratic institutions over autocratic ones to guarantee the implementation of benevolent public policies (Glaeser and Millett-Steinberg ) . By encouraging protests, urbanization stresses the inability of the regime to control protests, which then fosters opposition to autocracy.
 As a debate exists on the direction of this relationship, this article does not aim at explicating a causal link from one process to the other.  Several studies focus on the impact of information technologies on political participation (e.g., the introduction of newspapers significantly increased political participation-Gentzkow et al., ).

European Review of Economic History This rise in inequality increased demand for inclusive policies. Justman and Gradstein () develop this argument using industrialization in Great Britain as an illustration. Increasing revenues due to industrialization widened the income distribution. The median voter decided to implement inclusive policies as the disenfranchised control resources to ensure output maximization.
.. Industrialization and new interest groups. By increasing inequality, industrialization may have raised concerns over social issues, thus encouraging inclusive policies. Beside the new working class, it also promotes a new interest group: industrialists. The utility of this group directly rests on the benefits of the industrial activity. A pre-existing group (the landed elite) does not benefit from the industrial activity. A conflict between the two elites then arises over the type of public policies to implement: "clientelism" and particularistic policies reducing growth or public policies increasing public goods and productivity (Lizzeri and Persico ; Llavador and Oxoby ; Seim and Parente ). This split reduces the political hegemony of the landed elites. Congleton () in particular shows that by empowering industrialists industrialization increases the representativeness of parliaments. Industrialization in that sense vivified the political participation of certain groups.
.. Reaction of interest groups to redistribution. Industrialization increases political grievance (e.g., because of widen inequality) and empowers new interest groups (e.g., working class and industrialists). Since industrialization enlivens new political groups, its effect on the demand for democracy hinges on collective actions due to redistribution. As a consequence, discontent may emerge from both new groups protecting the emerging sector or groups from declining traditional sectors.
 Ansell and Samuels () show that in a case of rising income inequality, comparable to the consequences of industrialization; new economic groups will have a direct advantage in changing the type of regime in order to be protected from expropriation. Industrialists, as they grow, may engage in a contract with the autocratic leader prompting a smooth transition to inclusive institutions. This logic applies to the  plebiscite. The plebiscite was precisely on the consistence of inclusive reforms and its campaign mainly leant on the need for further reforms.
New interest groups may also demand democracy by another channel. Caprettini and Voth () observe that the adoption of the threshing machine in Great-Britain  As this study identifies a link between a structural change (industrialization) and political opposition, it does not shed light on the initiators of that opposition. Put differently, the problem of ecological fallacy is present here, but the limited data does not allow me to deal with this. I have to leave this to future work.
Steam democracy up! Industrialization-led opposition in Napoleonic plebiscites  encouraged the formation of the Swing Riots (which prompted the adoption of the Great Reform-Aidt and Franck ). Industrialization-led income redistribution fuels social unrest. This social unrest generates a "Threat of revolution" (Acemoglu and Robinson ) . In response to this threat of revolution, elites implement more inclusive institutions to avoid a wasteful revolution.
. Industrialization and the  plebiscite
. Peculiar French industrialization and political opposition
In the mid-XIX century, the French industrial sector was mostly composed of small units of production located in rural valleys (Lévy-Leboyer , p). These small units developed along waterways to benefit from both market access and waterpower. Meanwhile, craftsmen worked in small-scale workshops located in cities. In France, industrialization consequently barely correlated with other dimensions of modernization. This rural industrialization generated political turmoil. In the Loire basin, workers sabotaged coal mines. In order to avoid a total lockout of the region, the army intervened, sometimes resulting in casualties. For example, at La Ricamarie in June , an army's gunfire killed fourteen civilians who were trying to stop a military convoy leading forty strikers to jail. On  October, , the army directly shot strikers, killing seventeen persons in Aubin. No coordination existed at the national level; however Republicans used these strikes as a catch line to show the inability of the Empire to cope with the structural changes caused by industrialization.
. The  plebiscite
To contend with the opposition, Napoléon III promised that ministers would have to defend their bills before the legislative chamber in  and also implemented liberal reforms (abolition of pre-required authorizations to publish a journal and to convene nonpolitical meetings). In the  plebiscite, voters were asked to approve the following statement: "The people approve the liberal reforms conducted by the Emperor with the help of the State services and ratify the senatus-consulte of  April, ".
 The plebiscite directly referred to liberal reforms but its primary objective was to maintain the regime. The vote virtually had no impact on the implementation of the reforms but aimed at legitimating the autocratic nature of the Second Empire. As stated by Napoléon III on  April, , "By voting yes, you will stave off the threats of the revolution, you will establish freedom and order on solid grounds. Finally you will help me to transmit the crown to my son".

For these reasons, the need for political liberalization was the main theme of the campaign. Gambetta, one of the most prominent Republican leaders, used that rhetoric several times.

Hence, voting "No" in the plebiscite mainly meant rejecting despotism and autocracy. A  A senatus-consulte is a bill drafted by the Senate.  "En apportant au scrutin un vote affirmatif, vous conjurerez les menaces de la révolution, vous assoirez sur une base solide l'ordre et la liberté, et vous rendrez plus facile, dans l'avenir, la transmission de la couronne à mon fils." Official proclamation, La Presse, April th .  An interested reader could refer to Gambetta's speech at a youth banquet on  April, .

European Review of Economic History leaflet from the opposition listed the autocratic nature of the Empire as the main reason to vote "No" in the  plebiscite.  Even partisans of Napoléon III used this interpretation of the vote. In an explanatory note, a citizen of Chalonnes supporting the Emperor questioned the motivations of "No" voters.
 He wrote "incorrigible revolutionaries want to vote against the plebiscite because, according to them, it does not grant enough liberties: Which ones? Should we abolish the Empire and establish a Third Republic?" As stated by both parts, the opposition constructed its discourse on the need for a Republic and more inclusive institutions.
. Data

. Support to autocracy
Figure  shows that the opposition principally emerged around Paris. The Rhone valley was another center of opposition, as well as the départements bordering the Mediterranean Sea. On top of these main regions, several départements clearly opposed Napoléon III. NorthernEast France also showed little support to Napoléon III.
Interestingly, heterogeneity existed within regions. For example, in Southern-West France, Gironde and Haute-Garonne clearly opposed more than other départements in the region. The same applies to Brittany with the opposition appearing in the Finistère département. The two maps overlap. The Rhône valley, départements neighboring Paris were wellindustrialized and opposed more in the  plebiscite. Interestingly, the maps do not only exhibit similar regional patterns but the same within-regions heterogeneity: the Gironde département and the Finistère département, being industrial leaders in their regions, showed less support to Napoléon III in .
. Method
. Empirical models
In order to establish a positive impact of industrialization on opposition to autocracy, the study uses OLS and IV strategies. The baseline equation is the following:
where, Yes i 1870, is the ratio of Yes ballots over votes cast in ; Indus i 1866, is the number of persons employed in the industrial sector in ; X i is a set of control variables; α β and 1 1 are coefficients; A 1 is a vector of coefficients; and ϵ i 1, is the error term. Discrete variables are expressed in logarithm to ensure that extreme observations do not drive the observed correlation.
 Regression coefficients are estimated using heteroscedasticityrobust standard errors. As in Franck and Galor () , the baseline controls include geographic covariates prompting modernization through agricultural development: latitude, yearly average temperature, yearly average rainfall, digitalized from a ′×′ grid map by Hijmans 

European Review of Economic History et al. ; and soil quality from Ramankutty et al. () . A dummy variable for départements neighboring Paris and the aerial distance to Paris account for the possible dual diffusion of political opposition and economic development from Paris. Dummy variables both for maritime départements and border départements account for a possible influence of foreign institutions and trade on the political preferences and economic development in these départements. Adding these control variables also disentangles pre-industrial development due to favorable natural conditions from actual industrial development. The effect of trade is also directly controlled for using market integration in the s as an additional control variable.
 The more integrated to trade a département is the less it is expected to support autocracy as trade encourages the formation of a middle-class (see Acemoglu et al. ) or because of a possible backlash following the Cobden-Chevalier treaty.
 Controlling for market integration in the s also allows for distinguishing industrialization from pre-industrial market potential and development. In the more conservative specification, the baseline specification throughout the robustness checks section; the share of Yes ballots over votes cast in the  plebiscite is added as an extra control variable to capture long-term determinants of opposition to autocracy.
. Identification strategy
OLS estimates would be biased if political preferences determined the adoption of technology. For instance, Napoléon III may have used targeted economic development in area of high opposition to contend political opposition. As stated in his proclamation of  December, , his goal was "to end a revolutionary era by fulfilling people's legitimate claims". In that case, the observed correlation would suffer from reverse causality and the coefficient for the main independent variable would be artificially inflated. Likewise, vote-buying using industrial programs in barely industrialized regions would generate a downward bias in the estimate. Omitted variables would have the same consequences (i.e., unobserved département characteristics influencing the  plebiscite and correlating with industrialization). An IV strategy tackles these possible issues. Exogenous determinants of industrialization, such as access to power sources and the geographic distance to the first city having adopted steam engines (Fresnes-sur-Escaut), serve as instruments. Franck and Galor (, ) show that the adoption of steam engines in nineteenth century France varied with the distance to Fresnes-sur-Escaut. The aerial distance of each département's centroid to Fresnes-sur-Escaut is then added as a first instrument. In addition, Crafts and Wolf () present empirical evidence of the importance of power sources (water flows and coal) in the location of the cotton industry in nineteenth century Great Britain; providing two additional instruments for industrialization. The share of a département's surface covered by a carboniferous ( = coal bearing) geological strata measures access to coal (as in de Pleijt et al. ). Access to suitable water flows is computed using data from gauging stations in modern France.
 The measure is the fifth percentile of the historical distribution of the flows in cubic meter per second in each gauging station averaged at the département level (as in Crafts and Wolf ). It assesses the  Market integration in the s is measured by the number of firms selling their products outside of their own département (as in Daudin, ).  The Cobden-Chevalier treaty () was a free-trade agreement treaty between Great Britain and France.  Source: http://www.hydro.eaufrance.fr/indexd.php. The study used data from . gauging stations across France. For most of the stations, data on water flows have been collected over more than twenty years.
Steam democracy up! Industrialization-led opposition in Napoleonic plebiscites  availability of suitable water flows for the industrial activity. The interaction between these two instruments stresses the possible complementarities between these two power sources, as steam engines have been implemented in some places as a support to water wheels (Crafts and Wolf ). These instruments theoretically respect the exclusion restriction. Where, Indus i 1866, stands for industrial employment; DistFresnes i is the distance to Fresnessur-Escaut; Coal i is the share of a département's surface covered by a carboniferous geological strata, Water i is the fifth percentile of the distribution of the water flows in cubic meters per second in each gauging station averaged at the département level; X i is the set of control variables; α β β β , , ,
4 and β 5 are coefficients; A 2 is a vector of coefficients; and ϵ i 2, is the error term. These equations are estimated using SLS estimates. First-stage estimates (Online Appendix A) show that industrial employment correlates with both access to power sources and distance to Fresnes-sur-Escaut. To ensure that this strategy is not subject to overidentification, the next sections add more control variables and provide Hansen J p-stats.
. The effect of industrialization on the opposition to autocracy
Table  reports the results of the baseline model focusing on the effect of industrialization on the opposition to the Empire. The adjusted R  is equal to . in the bivariate specification (Column .) and reaches . in the specification with all baseline control variables (Column .).The instruments meet the relevance condition (the F-statistic of the first-stage is above  in each specification) and the Hansen J p-value is above . in each specification.
Column . presents the unconditional effect industrialization had on the vote outcomes in . The coefficient is significant at the -percent level and equals −.. For example, doubling industrial employment in the Puy-de-Dôme département would have decreased support to autocracy by . percentage points. When controlling for various geographic controls (Column .), industrialization still hampered adhesion to the Empire. The coefficient is higher in magnitude (−.) and significant at the -percent level.
The other specifications (. and .) include market integration in the s as an indicator of pre-industrialization market potential. Market potential in the s also increases opposition to the Empire in . This effect does not confound the one of industrialization; the coefficients for industrialization remain of the same magnitude and significant at the -percent level. Specifications . and . add the share of yes ballots over votes cast in the  plebiscite as an additional independent variable to control for time invariant factors determining political opposition.
Regardless of the set of controls, the coefficients of the "Industrialization" variable remain negative and significant at the -percent level in each OLS specification. The magnitude of the coefficient is stable over the various OLS specifications (between −. in Column . and −. in Column .). In IV specifications, the effect of industrialization is larger (significant at the -percent level coefficients between −. in Column . and −. in Column .).

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−.** −.*** −.*** −.*** −.*** −.*** −.*** (−.) Robust t-statistics in parentheses: ***p < ., **p < ., *p < .. Geographic controls include latitude, rainfall, temperature, soil quality, distance to Paris, border department ( =  if a department lies at a border), maritime department ( =  if a department is maritime), Paris ( =  for department neighboring Paris). All count variables are in logarithm using ln(k + ).
. Robustness Analyses
In order to test for the robustness of my results, I estimate several other specifications. First, I add controls for other dimensions of modernization. Second, proxies for preindustrial modernization are added as control variables. Third, alternative explanations of the vote are also considered. Fourth, a final series of robustness tests shows that the results are also robust to using alternative estimations techniques and variables of interest.
. Controlling for other dimensions of modernization
This section adds measures of modernization at the time of the plebiscite as control variables. It ensures that the relation between industrialization and opposition to autocracy does not emerge because of an omitted variable bias focusing on the three other dimensions of modernization cited in Lipset () (urbanization, wealth and human capital). Industrialization indeed correlates with other dimensions of modernization. In turn wealth (Lipset ; Gassebner et al., ; Treisman ), human capital accumulation (Papaioannou and Siourounis ) and urbanization (Glaeser and Millett-Steinberg ) all have an effect on democracy. These results ensure that the impact of industrialization on the preference for democracy does not operate only via one of those channels. The first dimension of modernization to be controlled for is wealth. Specifications in Table  include indicators of social conditions as control variables: the number of "hobos" per inhabitant in  and infant mortality in  (as a proxy for across départements differences in economic situation-Miller and Urdinola ; Baird et al. ).
After controlling for wealth, the baseline results remain unchanged. The set of instruments is still valid (F-stat above ) and satisfy the J-test (Hansen J p-stat above .). The Table  . Controlling for dimensions of modernization: wealth Robust t-statistics in parentheses: ***p < ., **p < ., *p < .. Geographic controls include latitude, rainfall, temperature, soil quality, distance to Paris, border department ( =  if a department lies at a border), maritime department ( =  if a department is maritime), Paris ( =  for department neighboring Paris). All count variables are in logarithm using ln(k + ). 
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−.** −.*** −.*** −.*** −.** −.*** (−.) ( −.)
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: ***p < ., **p < ., *p < .. Geographic controls include latitude, rainfall, temperature, soil quality, distance to Paris, border department ( =  if a department lies at a border), maritime department ( =  if a department is maritime), Paris ( =  for department neighboring Paris). All count variables are in logarithm using ln(k + ). Robust t-statistics in parentheses: ***p < ., **p < ., *p < .. Geographic controls include latitude, rainfall, temperature, soil quality, distance to Paris, border department ( =  if a department lies at a border), maritime department ( =  if a department is maritime), Paris ( =  for department neighboring Paris). All count variables are in logarithm using ln(k + ).

European Review of Economic History coefficients for the "Industrialization" variable vary between −. and −. and are significant at the -percent or the -percent level, in line with baseline results. New specifications also control for urbanization as it is often mentioned as parallel to industrialization (Rosenberg and Trajtenberg ) . The specifications presented in Table  control for urban population in  and/or population density in . This does not impact the quality of the results. The "Industrialization" variable bears coefficients between −. and −., which are significant at the  or the -percent level. Table  presents the results when controlling for measures of human capital accumulation. Industrialization fueled human capital accumulation (as described in Franck and Galor  or de Pleijt et al. ) or resulted from it. The baseline results remain unchanged even after controlling for various facets of human capital accumulation (coefficients for industrialization between −. and −. and significant at the  or -percent level).
As a result, none of the alternative dimensions of modernization explains the effect of industrialization on opposition to autocracy. As industrialization in France took off in rural areas, the various dimensions of modernization have been decoupled in time and in space; disentangling the intrinsic effect of each of them.
. Controlling for confounding factors
As an extra test, this section adds a series of pre-Second French Empire controls ( Table ) . This test isolates the effect of industrialization from pre-Second Empire outcomes that would not have impacted the  plebiscite but could have impacted the  plebiscite. They include pre-industrial development (population density in ), presence of enlightened elites (universities in ), local counter-powers (number of independent communes in , number of bishops in ), pre-industrial modes of production (number of iron forges in , number of mills in ) and pre-Second Empire preference for Napoléon III (vote share to Napoléon III in the  presidential elections).
Only two of these variables turn out to be significant. The number of mills in  bears a significant and positive coefficient and the vote share to Napoléon III is positively correlated with later support to the Empire. These effects however do not confound the one of industrialization on the opposition to autocracy. The coefficients of the "Industrialization" variable are of the same magnitude as baseline results and all significant at the -percent level. Baseline results and the validity of the IV strategy do not depend on long-term dynamics.
. Alternative explanations of the vote
This section controls for alternative explanations of the vote to guarantee that the effect of industrialization on the  plebiscite was due to differences in the support for democracy.
.. Religion. Religious groups may have prompted innovation leading to industrialization (e.g., the Protestant ethics, Weber ) and the opposition to Napoléon III. For example, the minister of Cults decided to control Protestants' evangelization meetings in , which spurred indignation in the community. Napoléon also later got in conflict with the Catholic Church. The effect of religious groups on the plebiscite is consequently ambiguous.
As evidenced in Table  , controlling for the importance of Protestants and Jews alters neither the adjusted R  nor the validity of the instruments. In addition, the coefficients for
Steam democracy up! Industrialization-led opposition in Napoleonic plebiscites  Table  . Controlling for confounding factors IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS Robust t-statistics in parentheses: ***p < ., **p < ., *p < .. Geographic controls include latitude, rainfall, temperature, soil quality, distance to Paris, border department ( =  if a department lies at a border), maritime department ( =  if a department is maritime), Paris ( =  for department neighboring Paris). All count variables are in logarithm using ln(k + ). Table  . Religious minorities the share of Protestants and the share of Jews in a département are never jointly significant. The coefficients for industrialization stay at baseline levels (between −., Column .; and −., Column .) and significant at the -percent or the -percent level.
.. Fraud. If electoral frauds were more common in non-industrialized départements, the coefficient for industrialization would be upward-biased. The number of reported frauds is nevertheless quite low, maximum two in a département. Furthermore, La Presse  and Le Siècle  report only cases of small-scale frauds and pressures (from municipal administration pressure to double-voting). Moreover, the impact of frauds on the vote is likely orthogonal to previous industrialization. As denoted by Miller () , Napoléon III used semi-competitive elections to gather information on the opposition to the regime.
To make sure that frauds do not drive the results, Table  adds the number of reported cases of fraud appearing either in Le Siècle or La Presse as an additional control variable. Adjusted R  remain above . in each specification and the instruments stay valid (firststage F-stat above ). The variable "Fraud" is insignificant, whereas the coefficients for "Industrialization" lay between −. and −. and are significant at the -percent or the -percent level. Controlling for the number of alleged frauds alters neither the significance nor the magnitude of the coefficients for industrialization. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: ***p < ., **p < ., *p < .. Geographic controls include latitude, rainfall, temperature, soil quality, distance to Paris, border department ( =  if a department lies at a border), maritime department ( =  if a department is maritime), Paris ( =  for department neighboring Paris). All count variables are in logarithm using ln(k + ).
 A newspaper supporting the regime.  A republican newspaper that published letters from citizens reporting cases of frauds.
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.. Threat of revolution/economic downturn. Industrialized départements may have been more impacted by trade agreements (e.g., Cobden-Chevalier treaty) or by the liquidity crisis in . An economic shock may have prompted the opposition to Napoléon III (see Brückner and Ciccone ). The Comptes généraux de l'Administration de la justice civile and commerciale provide each year a detailed account of bankruptcies at the department-level which allows controlling for département-specific shocks.
Table  presents results when controlling for the liabilities of bankrupting companies per inhabitant in the two years preceding the vote. This measure accounts for the average cost that the inhabitants of a département had to bear during the economic downturn before the vote. The adjusted-R  remains above . in each of the specifications and the instruments stay valid. The coefficient for the liabilities of bankrupting companies in  is significant at the -percent or the -percent level and negative (as predicted since  was the through of a liquidity crisis).
A dummy variable for départements affected by the phylloxera in  (from Banerjee et al. ) is added as a last control variable (Columns . to .). The "Phylloxera" dummy variable bears a negative and significant at the -percent level or -percent level coefficient. Yet, this effect does not confound the effect industrialization had in the plebiscite as the coefficients for the "Industrialization" variable remain consistent with the baseline results and are significant at least at the -percent level.
. Alternative specifications .. Alternative measures of industrialization. Table  tests the robustness of the results to using alternative measures of industrialization: the adoption rate of steam engines in  and in , the number of steam engines in  (as in Franck and Galor , ), the number of persons financially dependent on the industrial activity, the increase in the number of industrial workers and the proportion of industrial workers in the population.
All these variables negatively correlate with the support to the Empire. For all of them, an increase by one-standard deviation reduces support to the Empire by around five percentage points, in line with baseline results.
.. Alternative measure of the support for democracy. To ensure that the correlation between industrialization and the share of "Yes" ballots in the  plebiscite is not incidental, this section uses a measure of democratic consolidation at the onset of the Third Republic as dependent variable: the results of Republicans in the  general elections (Table ) .
 It allows guaranteeing that baseline results are not driven by a specific measure of support to democracy.
The coefficients of the "Industrialization" variable are significant at the -percent level both in the OLS specification and the IV specification and bear a positive sign. Industrialization during the Second Empire spurred democratic consolidation at the onset of the Third Republic. The measure of industrialization consequently influences other measures of preference for democracy. Results in the  plebiscite actually proxy well the preference for democracy over autocracy.
 E.g., Franck () uses the share of the Republican coalition at these elections as a proxy for democratic consolidation. Indeed, at these elections Republicans were mainly opposed to Monarchists and Bonapartists that supported former regimes. This opposition slowly vanished in the mid s.
Steam democracy up! Industrialization-led opposition in Napoleonic plebiscites  .. Alternative estimations methods. This section uses alternative estimation methods in order to tackle the possible biases emerging because of the structure of the data.
As the dataset only contains a limited number of observations, the relation may be driven by outliers. Hence, this section performs jackknife estimation techniques (both for the OLS and the IV specifications). Tables  and  present the minimum, the mean and the maximum values of the coefficient for the "Industrialization" variable after dropping each observation in turn.
For both specifications, the coefficients for the "Industrialization" variable are stable over the exclusion of different observations (−. to −. for the OLS specification; −. to −. for the IV specification) and significant at least at the -percent level. Moreover, the validity of the instruments does not depend on any single observation, the F-stat remains above  over the exclusion of each of the observations. The next estimations tackle the issue raised by Conley (). If industrialization and opposition to autocracy followed the same spatial diffusion, then spatial autocorrelation may drive the results. To tackle this issue, the next set of estimates uses Conley-type of errors. Using Conley standard errors corrects coefficients variance by explicitly modeling observations' geographical dependence. Here, standard errors are considered as possibly correlated if a département centroid is less than // km far from another département centroid (Table ) .
Accounting for spatial-autocorrelation slightly decreases standard errors and hence does not affect the statistical significance of the coefficient for industrialization. In the generalized two-stages least squares procedure accounting for spatial autocorrelation, the coefficient for the "Industrialization" variable is equal to −. and significant at the -percent level (with a spatial heteroroskedasticity robust t-stat equaling −.). Thus, spatial autocorrelation affects neither OLS estimates nor IV estimates. Robust t-statistics in parentheses: ***p < ., **p < ., *p < .. Geographic controls include latitude, rainfall, temperature, soil quality, distance to Paris, border department ( =  if a department lies at a border), maritime department ( =  if a department is maritime), Paris ( =  for department neighboring Paris). All count variables are in logarithm using ln(k + ).
. Conclusion
Industrialization triggered opposition to the Second French Empire in the  plebiscite even after controlling for various dimensions of modernization (urbanization, wealth, human capital). To give an example, if industrial employment would have doubled in the Puy-deDôme département, support to autocracy would have been .-. percentage points lower. Robust t-statistics in parentheses: ***p < ., **p < ., *p < .. Baseline controls include latitude, rainfall, temperature, soil quality, distance to Paris, border department ( =  if a department lies at a border), maritime department ( =  if a department is maritime), Paris ( =  for department neighboring Paris), Market integration in the s, (Yes/Cast)  . All count variables are in logarithm using ln(k + ). Robust t-statistics in parentheses: ***p < ., **p < ., *p < .. Controls include latitude, rainfall, temperature, soil quality, distance to Paris, border department ( =  if a department lies at a border), maritime department ( =  if a department is maritime), Paris ( =  for department neighboring Paris), market integration in s, (Yes/ Cast)  . All count variables are in logarithm using ln(k + ). 
